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Case No. 20151012-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
ROGER WAYNE SIMMONS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Roger Simmons appeals from convictions for driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a third-degree felony, and alcohol-restricted 
driver and operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock system, both 
class B misdemeanors. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
By his own admission, Simmons has a problem with alcohol abuse. 
He has a long history of alcohol-related offenses, including driving while 
intoxicated (DUI). While DUI charges were pending from a 2011 offense, he 
was charged with DUI in the present case. Six months later, he was charged 
with another DUI. 
Simmons pleaded guilty in March 2015 to the 2011 DUI. A 
presentence investigation report (PSR) was prepared and recommended 
that Simmons be sent to prison. The trial court agreed. Simmons later 
pleaded guilty in the present case and Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) 
submitted the prior PSR with an addendum. In prose filings to the court 
and in a pro se argument at the sentencing hearing, Simmons vociferously 
complained that AP&P was biased and that the PSR was rife with errors. 
Before sentence was am1ounced, the trial court opined that Simmons' 
complaints were about only how the PSR was investigated and prepared, 
not that it contained factual inaccuracies. While the trial court's assessment 
was correct for the most part, Simmons did articulate a handful of errors 
that the court failed to resolve on the record. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Should this case be remanded for the purpose of (1) entering 
findings in compliance with the trial court's duty to resolve inaccuracies in 
the PSR on the record, and (2) resentencing Defendant in light of those 
findings? 
Standard of Review. Whether the trial court complied with a legal duty 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Waterfield, 2014 UT 
App 67, if 29, 248 P.3d 57. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2015) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Prior DUI 
In September 2011, police saw a car entering the airport traveling 
thirty miles per hour in a fifty mile per hour zone. R317. The car drifted over 
the center line and failed to stop at a stop sign. Id. When officers attempted 
to initiate a stop, the car accelerated down the road and ran another stop 
sign. Id. The car turned into a parking lot and came to a stop after crashing 
into a cement barrier. Id. When an officer made contact with the driver-
Simmons-he immediately detected a strong odor of alcohol and noticed 
that Simmons was fumbling with his keys. Id. Simmons denied consuming 
alcohol, but a forty-four ounce cup of beer was found in the console. R318. 
Simmons refused to perform a field sobriety test. Id. Officers arrested 
and transported him to the police station. Id. Officers also obtained a 
1Because this is an appeal of a sentencing issue from a guilty plea 
where no preliminary hearing was held, the facts are primarily taken from 
the probable cause statement attached to the original and amended 
informations, the PSR, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing. See R3, 
67-68, 289, 310, 317. 
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warrant for a blood draw, but Simmons became combative, cursed at 
officers, and attempted to spit on them as they tried to restrain him. Id. The 
toxicology report showed that Simmons' blood alcohol content exceeded the 
legal limit. Id. 
Current DUI 
In the present case, in August 2014, officers from the Unified Police 
Department saw a car swerving from left to right, crossing the center travel 
lane, and not maintaining its lane of travel. R3, 67, 310. After stopping the 
car and making contact with the driver-later identified as Simmons-one 
of the officers immediately detected the odor of alcohol. R3, 67-68, 310. An 
assisting officer also smelled alcohol and noted that that Simmons' speech 
was slurred. R3, 68, 310. Officers determined that Simmons was an alcohol 
and ignition interlock-restricted driver, and noted that he did not have an 
interlock device installed on his car. R3, 67-68, 310. Nor did Simmons have 
proof of insurance. Id. Officers asked Simmons to perform a field sobriety 
test, but he refused. Id. Officers arrested Simmons and a subsequent blood 
draw showed that his blood alcohol level was above the legal limit. Id. 
Subsequent DUI 
In November 2014, Simmons was again arrested for-and later 
charged with-another DUL R101, 114,289,311. 
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B. Summary of proceedings. 
Charges and Pleas 
Simmons pleaded guilty in March 2015 to the September 2011 DUI, a 
third-degree felony. R315. AP&P prepared a PSR and recommended that he 
be sent to the Utah State Prison. R315. The court in that case followed 
AP&P's recommendation. R278, 312. Then, in the present case, Simmons 
was charged with DUI for the August 2014 incident, along with several 
misdemeanor charges, including alcohol-restricted driver, operating a 
vehicle without an ignition interlock system, no proof of insurance, and 
failure to stay in one lane. Rl-3. 
After the trial court sentenced Simmons for the September 2011 DUI, 
l 
he pleaded guilty in the present case to DUI, a third-degree felony, and two 
class B misdemeanors for alcohol-restricted driver and operating a vehicle 
without an ignition interlock system. R81, 84. The prosecutor agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend that the sentences run 
concurrently with one another, but consecutive to the prison commitment 
Simmons was already serving for the September 2011 DUI conviction. Id. 
The PSR 
Within days of pleading guilty, Simmons requested a copy of his 
prior PSR. R88-89. He then filed a motion to continue the sentencing 
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hearing. R94-99. Simmons argued, in part, that the previous PSR was 
inaccurate. R99. Without referencing specific entries, he claimed that his 
"BCI file" had errors, that there were duplicate items, that a third-degree 
felony was reduced to a class B misdemeanor twelve years ago, that a class 
A misdemeanor was held in abeyance and should not appear, and that a 
class B misdemeanor appears as a commitment, but was held in abeyance 
with all jail time suspended. R99, 417-18. 
AP&P subsequently submitted the previous PSR, together with an 
addendum report specific to the present case. R308-315. AP&P again 
recommended that Simmons be sent to prison. R309. Before the sentencing 
hearing, the prosecutor filed a motion challenging the accuracy of the PSR. 
R109-15. The prosecutor essentially argued that the criminal history portion 
of the PSR was incomplete and the prosecutor therefore provided a 
complete version. Rll0-14. Simmons, through counsel, objected because the 
prosecutor did not challenge the criminal history when the PSR was 
submitted in Simmons' prior case.2 R119. 
In addition, Simmons filed multiple pro se motions and memoranda 
making general allegations that essential information he provided to AP&P 
2The record nowhere indicates that the prosecutor's motion was ever 
resolved. And the State's corrected criminal history does not appear in any 
updated PSR. 
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was excluded from the PSR, that he had additional information for the 
court, that many statements in the PSR were untrue, that the PSR contained 
significant errors and disinformation, that there were numerous duplicate 
charges, that the dismissed charges should not have been included, that the 
PSR was written with a negative slant, that the employment history was not 
sufficiently detailed, and that mitigating circumstances were missing. R127-
28, 139-41, 144, 151-52, 162-65, 172-73, 176, 349, 367, 369, 371-74, 386, 388-90, 
399-400 I 429-30 I 434. 
In more specific terms, Simmons argued that the PSR falsely stated 
that he failed to disclose his prior offenses and refused to take responsibility 
for his current offense, that he had only one prior commitment, in 2004, that 
any other indication of commitment in the PSR was erroneous, and that 
there was an unnamed problem with his 2000 simple assault class B 
misdemeanor conviction. R145, 175, 320. Simmons also took issue with the 
PSR' s claim that he had been involved in accidents that resulted in property 
damage and that he had a history of domestic violence. R176, 316. Simmons 
argued that the PSR' s statement that he "surrounds himself with 
individuals involved in criminal activity" is false R309. See also R380-84. 
Finally, Simmons argued that the PSR' s claim that he only stays in touch 
with his mother was inaccurate because he sees his father when he visits 
-7-
North Carolina. R309, 316, 411. 
Sentencing Hearing 
The trial court heard at length from Simmons at the sentencing 
hearing. R273-76, 278-82, 286-89, 293-95. Simmons explained that he wanted 
the court to have a correct, honest PSR from AP&P. R273. He asserted-
without specifics-that the PSR was full of errors, lacked essential 
information, was incomplete, and was "grossly incorrect" and "wrong." 
R274, 279-80, 282. 
But Simmons also specifically alleged that the PSR's statement that he 
"takes a victim standpoint" was false and that he told AP&P that he does 
not consider himself a victim. R293-94, 319. He also contested any claim that 
he was previously involved in an accident that resulted in damage to 
another car. R294. 
The trial court stated that it had reviewed Simmons' "voluminous 
documents to the court outlining his view of the sentencing process," 
"together with both your objections to the presentence report, your 
objections to the process of conducting the presentence investigation that 
led to the report as well as the presentence report that you submitted on 
your own behalf, the so called corrected presentence report." R271, 277. But 
the court believed that Simmons was only complaining about the process by 
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which the presentence report was investigated and prepared, not the factual 
underpinnings of the report. Id. Indeed, the court specifically stated, "The 
thing that struck me about the pre- --the pleadings that you filed, is that 
nowhere in the pleadings that I reviewed did I see any indication that you 
believe the underlying facts were incorrect." R277-78. 
The court went on to explain that-because Simmons was already in 
prison-the only question was whether Simmons' new sentence should be 
ordered to run concurrently or consecutively with the prior sentence. R278. 
According to the trial court, "no other sentence other than that makes any 
sense under the circumstances. It doesn't make sense for me to send you to 
jail or to probation or anything else because you are currently serving a 
period of up to five years in prison in the Utah State Prison." Id. 
Without resolving on the record any alleged inaccuracies in the PSR-
because the trial court believed Simmons never actually raised any factual 
inaccuracies - the court sentenced Simmons. R295-96. The court imposed a 
prison term of zero to five years for the DUI conviction, up to six month for 
the alcohol-restricted driver conviction, and up to ninety days for the 
interlock-restricted driver conviction. R296. The three sentences were 
ordered to run concurrently with one another. Id. But after taking into 
account Simmons' struggle with alcohol abuse, his propensity for driving 
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while intoxicated, and the court's obligation to protect the community, the 
court ordered the three sentences to run consecutively to the prison 
sentence Simmons was then serving. R296-97. 
Simmons timely appealed. R258-59. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both before and at the time of sentencing, Simmons made broad, 
generalized allegations that the PSR was incorrect. But he also made several 
challenges to the accuracy of specific statements in the PSR. While the trial 
court acknowledged that Simmons had objected to the PSR, it incorrectly 
concluded that Simmons' complaints were only about AP&P's investigation 
and preparation of the PSR, not its factual underpinnings. Consequently, 
the court did not make the specific accuracy and relevancy findings 
required by Utah Code Ann.§ 77-18-1(6)(a). 
This Court should therefore remand the case with instructions that 
the trial court make the appropriate findings. Simmons' sentence, however, 
should not be set aside. None of the alleged PSR errors would have altered 
AP&P's recommendation that Simmons be sentenced to prison, nor would 
they have affected the trial court's decision to run the sentences 
consecutively with the sentence Simmons was currently serving. 
-10-
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ARGUMENT 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE SOLE 
PURPOSE OF RESOLVING ALLEGED INACCUR-
ACIES IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT; DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED 
At the sentencing hearing and in numerous prose filings to the trial 
court, Simmons made broad, generalized claims that his PSR was inaccurate 
and erroneous because, for example, it excluded essential information, 
included numerous duplicate and dismissed charges in the criminal history, 
was written with a negative slant, insufficiently detailed his employment 
history, and excluded mitigating circumstances. R127-28, 139-41, 144, 151-
52, 162-65, 172-73, 176, 273-76, 278-82, 286-89, 293-95, 349, 367, 369, 371-74, 
386, 388-90, 399-400, 429-30, 434. He further claimed that AP&P was biased 
and failed to include much of the information Simmons provided that he 
believed would give the court a better understanding of his circumstances. 
R127-28, 139-44, 151-52, 162-65, 172-73, 349, 367, 369-74, 388-90. He 
asserted-again, without specifics-that the PSR was rife with errors and 
completely incorrect. Id. 
But buried in the "voluminous documents" he filed, Simmons also 
made several accuracy challenges to specific parts of the PSR. He asserted, 
for example, that the PSR inaccurately stated that he (1) was guilty in 2000 
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of simple assault, a class B misdemeanor, and sent to jail, when in fact it was 
.a plea in abeyance with no jail time; (2) failed to disclose his prior offenses 
and refused to take responsibility for his current offense; (3) had other 
commitments besides the one in 2004; ( 4) had been in accidents that resulted 
in property damage; (5) had a history of domestic violence; ( 6) surrounded 
himself with individuals involved in criminal activity; (7) had not provided 
verification for his high school diploma; and (8) only stayed in touch with 
his mother. R145, 175-76, 202, 293-94, 309, 316, 319-20, 380-84, 411. See also 
Aplt. Br. at 3-5.3 
On appeal, Simmons argues that the trial court failed to address his 
challenges to the accuracy of the PSR and did not make specific findings on 
the record as required under section 77-18-1(6)(a). See Aplt. Br. at 8, 10-12. 
3Simmons also raises other alleged inaccuracies that do not have 
record support. For example, he says that the PSR falsely states that he 
consumed alcohol while under supervision and failed random drug tests. 
Aplt. Br. at 4. But no citation to the PSR is provided and the State has been 
unable to find these statements in the PSR. He also alleges that "he should 
have only had three priors: two prior third degree felony DUis, one from 
2004 and one from 2011 in which he successfully finished probation. He said 
he should only have one class A misdemeanor in 2004." Id. But the PSR says 
he has "two felony convictions," R309, though none from 2011, and one 
class A misdemeanor in 2004. R320. Finally, Simmons alleges that the PSR 
inaccurately states that his lack of education is a risk factor for criminality 
and that he has employment risks. Id. at 4-5. But again, no citation to the 
PSR is provided and the State has been unable to find these statements in 
the PSR. 
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He contends-without citation to any authority- that the court's failure 
"necessitates reversal." Id. at 10. See also id. at 8 (suggesting-without 
argument-that "the effect of the court's errors may well require 
resen tencing."). 4 
Section 77-18-1 requires a trial court to "make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record" of any alleged inaccuracies in the 
PSR. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a). Once a defendant alleges that his PSR 
contains unresolved "'factual inaccuracies,' the court 'must do three things: 
first, consider the objection raised; second, make findings on the record 
regarding the accuracy of the information at issue; and third, determine on 
the record the relevance of that information as it relates to sentencing.'" 
4Simmons also argues that "[i]n the event the State were to assert" 
that the issue of his PSR objections was not preserved, then this Court must 
consider whether (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not asking the trial 
court to make the required finding, and (2) the trial court abused its 
discretion when it allegedly failed to inquire into a potential conflict of 
interest between counsel and Simmons. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. But the State is not 
asserting that the PSR objections issue is unpreserved. 111 An issue is 
preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such 
a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]."' Brown v. State, 2015 
UT App 254, 120, 361 P.3d 124 (quoting Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, 19, 
293 P.3d 259) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Here, the trial court was fully aware of Simmons' objections, had 
an opportunity to rule on the issue, but mistakenly concluded that Simmons 
was not alleging any factual inaccuracies. R277-78. As Simmons himself 
suggests, because the PSR objections issue was properly preserved, this 
Court need not address his counsel-ineffectiveness and conflict of interest 
issues. See Aplt. Br. at 8-9, 12-13. 
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State v. Abelon, 2016 UT App 22, if19, 369 P.3d 113 (emphasis in original) 
( quoting State v. Monroe, 2015 UT App 48, ,r 6, 345 P.3d 755). If the court fails 
to do so, "the proper remedy is to remand [the] case to the trial court with 
instructions that it expressly resolve [defendant's] objections in full 
compliance with section 77-18-1(6)(a)." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, if 45, 973 
P.2d404. 
Here, the trial court acknow !edged that Simmons objected to the PSR, 
but concluded that his complaints went only to AP&P' s investigation and 
preparation of the PSR, not its factual underpinnings. R277-78, 283. 
Simmons, however, had made a handful of challenges to the accuracy of the 
PSR. See R145, 175-76, 202, 293-94, 309,316, 319-20, 380-84, 411. Because the 
trial court mistakenly determined that none of Simmons' objections were 
about factual inaccuracies, it did not make the accuracy and relevancy 
findings required by section 77-18-1(6)(a). The State therefore agrees that the 
case should be remanded to allow the trial court to "make the specific 
findings on the record as mandated by the statute." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 
62, if15, 6 P.3d 1133. 
But a "district court's failure to fully resolve a defendant's objections 
t_o a [PSR] does not necessarily require reversal of the defendant's sentence." 
State v. Post, 2015 UT App 162, ifll, 354 P.3d 810 (citing Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 
-14-
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if45). This is particularly so when a defendant "fails to explain how 
resolution of the alleged errors in his favor might have affected the outcome 
of his sentence." Id. Here, Simmons makes only three conclusory assertions 
that he should be resentenced. See Aplt. Br. at 8, 10, 17 ("the effect of the 
court's errors may well require resentencing"; the "court did not comport 
with [its] duty, which necessitates reversal"; if trial court "on remand finds 
that the PSR is indeed inaccurate, the court should order that it be allowed 
to resentence Mr. Simmons accordingly"). He nowhere provides any 
reasoned analysis establishing that a favorable resolution of his objections 
would necessitate resentencing. See State v. Waterfield, 2011 UT App 27, 
iJifl0-11, 248 P.3d 57 (remanding for trial court to resolve alleged 
inaccuracies in PSR but affirming sentence because defendant inadequately 
briefed his argument that he should be resentenced). 
In any event, the record shows that resolving Simmons' objections in 
his favor would not alter the trial court's sentencing decision. Simmons was 
already incarcerated on a prior third-degree felony DUI when he was 
sentenced in the present case. R278. And while his case was pending, he 
reoffended and was charged with another third-degree felony DUI. R311. In 
addition, al though Simmons has challenged limited portions of his criminal 
history, he nowhere contests that he has an alcohol abuse problem and a 
-15-
penchant for driving while intoxicated. R296. 
Against this backdrop, the trial court stated that "the only substantive 
question for me to answer under these circumstances is whether or not you 
receive a sentence of prison that be ordered to be served concurrently or 
consecutively to the sentence that you are currently serving." R278. The 
court expressly rejected a sentence of jail or probation. R278. In considering 
the appropriate punishment, the dispositive issue for the court was 
Simmons' "desire to drive while ... under the influence of alcohol. And that 
is my compelling concern because I have an obligation to protect the 
community." R297. Under these circumstances, even if all Simmons' 
objections were resolved in his favor-including those addressing his 
criminal history, whether his crimes resulted in property damage, and 
whether he takes responsibility for his actions-none of them would have 
altered the trial court's central concern that society be protected from 
Simmons predilection for drinking while intoxicated. 
In sum, the State agrees that Simmons' case should be remanded to 
allow the trial court to resolve on the record Simmons' objections to the 
PSR. But because even a favorable resolution of his objections would not 
alter the trial court's sentence, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
decision to send Simmons to prison and run his sentences consecutively 
-16-
L ...., 
with the prison term he is already serving. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on November 14, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
~q{\(~dcl 
MARK C. FIELD 
ASSIST ANT SOLICITOR GENERAL 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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., ADDENDA 
, 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann.§ '77-18-1 
J 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of scntence--Pleas held in abeyance-Probation-Supervision-
Presentence investigation-Standards-Confidentiality-Terms and conditions-
Termination, revocation, modification, or extension-Hearings-Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in abeyance 
agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in 
Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty with a mental illness, no contest, or conviction of any crime or 
offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases 
of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation under the supervision of an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on court probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with 
the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is 
vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(iv) Court probation may include an administrative level of services, including notification 
to the court of scheduled periodic reviews of the probationer's compliance with conditions. 
(c) Supervised probation services provided by the department, an agency oflocal government, 
or a private organization shall specifically address the offender's risk of reoffending as 
identified by a validated risk and needs screening or assessment. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all 
individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the results of a risk and needs assessment; 
(iii) the demand for services; 
(iv) the availability of agency resources; 
(v) public safety; and 
(vi) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall 
be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council 
and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to 
adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the 
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
( e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the 
probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct 
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presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the 
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department 
standards. 
(5) (a) Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for 
the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or information 
from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 
describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family; 
(ii) a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from 
the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 3 8a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
(iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under 
Section 77-18-1.1; 
(iv) recommendations for treatment of the offender; and 
(v) the number of days since the commission of the offense that the offender has spent in 
the custody of the jail and the number of days, if any, the offender was released to a 
supervised release or alternative incarceration program under Section 17-22-5.5. 
( c) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are not available 
except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or 
for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's 
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for 
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant 
an additional 10 working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after 10 working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make 
a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time 
of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This 
testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence 
of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in which 
the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court 
finds most appropriate; 
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(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory 
service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance with 
Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED 
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has 
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on 
probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection 
(8)(b )(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 
77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any 
extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions, or as allowed 
pursuant to Section 64-13-21 regarding earned credits. 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(l0)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the 
account receivable. If the court retains jurisdiction for this limited purpose, the court 
may order the defendant to pay to the court the costs associated with continued 
probation under this Subsection (10). 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil 
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer 
responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the defendant's 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection, 
and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of 
supervised probation is being requested by the department or will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable . 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged 
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with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute 
service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a 
hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning 
revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation 
term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(iii)Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning 
revocation of probation constitutes service of time toward a term of incarceration 
imposed as a result of the revocation of probation or a graduated sanction imposed under 
Section 63M-7-404. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with the 
court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an 
order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may be modified as is consistent with the graduated sanctions and 
incentives developed by the Utah Sentencing Commission under Section 63M-7-404, but 
the length of probation may not be extended, except upon waiver of a hearing by the 
probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the 
conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall 
determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, 
modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on· the 
defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii)The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent. 
(iv)The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
( d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall 
present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii)The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based 
shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court 
for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv)The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own behalf, 
and present evidence. 
( e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or reinstated for all or a portion of the 
original term of probation. 
(iii)If a period of incarceration is imposed for a violation, the defendant shall be 
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sentenced within the guidelines established by the Utah Sentencing Commission 
pursuant to Subsection 63M-7-404(4), unless the judge determines that: 
(A) the defendant needs substance abuse or mental health treatment, as determined 
by a validated risk and needs screening and assessment, that warrants treatment 
services that are immediately available in the community; or 
(B) the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(iv)If the defendant had, prior to the imposition of a term of incarceration or the 
execution of the previously imposed sentence under this Subsection (12), served time in 
jail as a condition of probation or due to a violation of probation under Subsection 
77-18-1(12)(e)(iii), the time the probationer served in jail constitutes service of time 
toward the sentence previously imposed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself or herself to the custody of the 
Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital 
or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment 
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with Title 630, 
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
630-2-403 and 630-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a 
presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this 
section, the department may disclose the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 630-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department for 
purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
( e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or 
the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall include 
only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the 
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the 
crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals refeued to the department in accordance 
with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement 
unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
( c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
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(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
( d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic 
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and 
install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii)order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the 
department or the program provider. 
( e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring 
only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either 
directly or by contract with a private provider. 
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